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Methodologies Matter 
From Axel Honneth’s Reformism to John Dewey’s Radicalism
Dirk Jörke and Philipp Wagenhals
 
Introduction
1 Axel  Honneth  and  John  Dewey  are  both  regarded  as  progressive  thinkers  of  the
(left-)Hegelian  tradition.  But  when  comparing  their  politico-economic  demands,  it
quickly becomes clear that Dewey’s political theory leads to more radical consequences:
Whereas Honneth expresses reformist demands regarding minimum wage, Dewey, for
instance,  is  not  afraid  to  also  raise  the  question  of  property  and  to  suggest
comprehensive nationalizations in the finance sector (Dewey LW 9: 77; LW 9: 287-90).
Robert Westbrook (1991) thus rightly described the latter as a “democratic socialist.”
The central thesis of this essay is that this difference stems not only from historical
factors but also from the methodological layout of their respective systems of thought.
Honneth’s  method  of  normative  reconstruction,  which  he  develops  particularly  in
Freedom’s  Right,  has  frequently  and  convincingly  been  criticized  as  being  too
affirmative.  The  point  of  our  argumentation  shall  be  that  it  is  precisely  Dewey’s
problem-solving  approach  that  offers  an  alternative  to  Honneth’s  reformism.  This
comes  as  a  surprise  at  first  glance,  insofar  as  Dewey’s  instrumentalism  and
experimentalism can easily be misunderstood as overly detailed conformist thinking
and has been interpreted as such, for example by Max Horkheimer (2013 [1947]: 27-37).
In  comparison  to  this,  we  aim  to  illustrate  the  at  least  potential  radically
transformative implications that are attached to Dewey’s problem-solving oriented way
of thinking by contrasting it with Honneth’s agenda of normative reconstruction. We
are not concerned with the question of which method is more “radical” per se, but
rather with showing that Dewey’s method of problem-solving can lead to more radical
political consequences under certain circumstances that need further elaboration. Nor
are we concerned with the fundamental question of whether, and if so to what extent,
radical  reforms  are  in  themselves  better  than  gradual  reformism.  Rather,  we  are
interested in showing that there may be problematic situations in which more radical
changes  are  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  democratic  values,  including  those  that
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affect a society’s normative foundations, such as the legitimacy of private property.
“Radical” means for us the aim to change some of the fundamental ordering principles
of the society, e.g. the structure of ownership.
2 Two threads of discussion spanning the last two decades within Critical Theory will
serve as the backdrop for this essay. The first of them is Critical Theory’s increasing
openness  towards  Dewey’s  pragmatism,  thus  turning  away  from  the  overly  eager
prejudgment by the Frankfurt school’s first generation. Honneth himself (1998a; 1998b)
made a valuable contribution in this context early on by granting Dewey’s philosophy
an increasing amount of space in his own reflections – even if, according to our thesis,
he does not fully acknowledge its possibilities (apart from Honneth e.g. Hartmann 2003;
Särkelä 2017; Jaeggi 2018). The second thread of discussion consists of the numerous
publications especially from around the 2010s (e.g. Jaeggi & Wesche 2009; Forst et al.
2009;  Stahl  2013;  Freyenhagen  2017;  Jaeggi  2018)  and  their  reflection  on  critical
methodology,  to  which Honneth’s  Freedom’s  Right (2014)  and its  presentation of  the
method of normative reconstruction contributes as well. But in these methodological
debates  the  potential  of  pragmatism  is  not,  or  with  regard  to  Jaeggi  (2018)  not
sufficiently, acknowledged. Although we will mainly deal with Honneth’s methodology,
in the end we will also briefly discuss Rahel Jaeggi’s appropriation of Deweyian themes.
Even though Jaeggi avoids Honneth’s central methodological weaknesses, her reading
of  Dewey,  too,  remains  flawed  because  her  adaption  of  Deweyian  themes  in  her
materialistic-pragmatist account of progress still neglects Dewey’s potential for critical
theories.
3 Against the backdrop of growing interest in Dewey’s thinking and the methodological
reflection of Critical Theory, it is even more regrettable that Dewey’s reflections on
methodology  have  until  now  –  as  is  the  case  with  Honneth,  who  only  eclectically
resorts to the former’s notion of problem(-solving) – barely stirred interest in the field
of Critical Theory or still get dismissed as ultimately being inadequate in favor of a
more  Hegelian account  (Jaeggi  2018).  It  seems as  if  the  old  reservations  of  Critical
Theory that have since been presented more than once as outdated and misguided (e.g.
Brunkhorst 2001; Särkelä 2018) have in this regard still not been completely overcome.1
We therefore consider a rigorous examination of Dewey’s method to be of even greater
importance – not only because of its compatibility with Critical Theory but also because
we  believe  that  his method  proves  to  be  superior  especially  in  comparison  with
Honneth’s normative reconstruction.
4 First, we shall illustrate the main features of Honneth’s normative reconstruction and
discuss  the  criticisms  his  suggestions  receive.  The  second  part  takes  up  Honneth’s
reaction  to  this  criticism  as  well  as  his  adaptation  of  Dewey’s  experimentalism,
claiming that Honneth’s reception of Dewey does not tap the latter’s full potential. The
third section will  focus in due briefness on Dewey’s orientation towards democratic
socialism. This  part  aims to showcase the substantial  difference between Honneth’s
gradualism and Dewey’s radicalism. Thus, we will look more intensively into Dewey’s
method of problem-solving activity in part four of this essay. In this context, Dewey’s
philosophy  of  the  “creativity  of  action”  (Joas  1997)  opens  up  the  perspective  of  a
fundamental reorganization of social institutions. The fifth and last part of this essay
serves to demonstrate why Dewey’s method proves to be superior, especially in light of
the challenges democracy faces today.
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1. Honneth’s Normative Reconstruction
5 Between Honneth’s earlier and later works, one cannot only recognize a conceptual
shift  from  the  notion  of  recognition  to  that  of  (social)  freedom,  but  also  a
methodological change resulting in his method of “normative reconstruction” as he
lays it out on the first pages of Freedom’s Right (Honneth 2014: 1-11). His methodological
reflections begin with a far-reaching diagnosis of the deficits of the currently dominant
Kantian-idealist theories of justice. For Honneth, their dominance is closely connected
to the history of the reception of Hegel’s philosophy of right. The fact that the latter is
predominantly  regarded  as  conservative  –  in  Honneth’s  words,  “the  somewhat
primitive  idea  that  given  institutions  must  be  given  an  aura  of  moral  legitimacy”
(Honneth 2014: 1) – led, says Honneth, to the current dominance of the Kantian-idealist
theories in the first place. In contrast, Honneth’s method of normative reconstruction
pursues a goal that is partly based on Hegel’s philosophy of right, namely to “develop
the principles of social justice by means of an analysis of society” (Honneth 2014: xii).
Consequently, Honneth not only strives to overcome the idealist deficit but – just as
Hegel  –  aims  to  avoid  the  separation  of  empirical  social  sciences  and  normative
philosophy.  In  order  to  obtain  an  updated  version  of  the  Hegelian  scheme,  it  is,
however,  necessary to overcome the latter’s  “idealistic  monism” (Honneth 2014:  3).
Given the horrors of  the past  two centuries  and considering materialist  insights  in
philosophy, Honneth thus wants to build on Hegel, but from the standpoint of changed
social circumstances and conditions of philosophical argumentation.
6 In order to develop the project of a theory of justice linked to Hegel in the style of
social  analysis,  Honneth  formulates  four  central  premises  for  such  a  methodology
(Honneth 2014: 3-11):
1)  The reproduction of  societies  is  tied  to  the  conditions  of  a  common orientation
towards central values:  Honneth formulates this premise with reference to Parsons,
who states that values get incorporated into other subordinated social  segments by
ways of the cultural system and in the shape of role expectations, commitments and
ideals.
2) The notion of justice is not independent of these values: Those values forming the
conditions  of  reproduction  for  the  respective  society  will  serve  as  moral  points  of
reference. Honneth thus envisions an analysis with an immanent starting point, and by
doing  so,  he  is  setting  himself  apart  from  the  Kantian-constructivist  projects  of
Habermas and Rawls. This is the moment the method of normative construction takes
effect: “This procedure implements the normative aims of a theory of justice through
social  analysis,  taking  immanently  justified  value  as  a  criterion  for  processing  and
sorting out the empirical material.” (Honneth 2014: 6).
3) Honneth emphasizes that society may not be regarded as an “already sufficiently
analysed social reality itself” (Honneth 2014: 7) to which the immanently mapped-out
principles will yet again be applied from the outside. Instead, the process of normative
reconstruction aims at designating and characterizing especially those social spheres
that  guarantee  the  realization  of  the  above-mentioned  general  values  –  in  Hegel’s
words, the “ethical life.” This shall serve to draw attention to even those institutions
and practices that are otherwise marginalized.
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4)  The  process  of  normative  reconstruction  must  offer  an  opportunity  for  critical
application:  What  is  criticized  is  that  existing  institutions  and  practices  could  be
presenting certain values in an even more encompassing way.
7 By  means  of  these  four  principles,  Honneth  intends  to  reconstruct  the  “moral
grammar” (Honneth 2014:  127)  of  modern societies.  His  “initial  premise”  (Honneth
2014: vii) for this is that in modern, liberal societies all values can be subsumed under
that of individual freedom. The notion of freedom is of such great interest to Honneth
at this point because he recognizes in it the potential to mediate between the level of
the individual and that of the social order. According to Honneth, modern societies can
only rely on the notion of freedom, understood as “the autonomy of the individual”
(Honneth 2014: 15), in order to justify certain institutions being worthy of recognition.
In this context, the normative reconstruction of central social values functions as an
important part in Honneth’s project of filling a lacuna in his earlier works: Through the
interplay of the notions of freedom and recognition, Honneth’s theory is liberated from
its  intersubjective  corset2 and in addition extended towards a  more comprehensive
understanding of social practice (“gesellschaftliche Praxis,” Lepold 2017: 291), based on
the assumption that society is understood as an interplay of spheres of action. Honneth
distinguishes between two types of  spheres of  action,  within which he normatively
reconstructs the respective principles of justice: Right and morality belong to the mode
of  the  “possibility  of  freedom”;  personal  relationships,  market  economy,  and
democratic public to that of the “reality of freedom” (Honneth 2014: 66). Within each
sphere the value of personal freedom will unfold itself in its respective context-specific
variations. 
8 At this point,  the question arises whether Honneth’s commitments to an immanent
method threaten to eventually slide into an optimism regarding the developmental
history and tendencies of modern societies that is lacking further substantiation (and,
in our view, cannot be further substantiated). For that reason, Frank Nullmeier (2013)
brings forward the compelling argument that, in order to tell the story of the progress
of  modern  institutions,  Honneth  circumvents  this  dilemma  by  relying  on  a  quasi-
external  position  towards  these  institutions,  which  is  established  by  way  of
retrospection.  When  Honneth  constructs  a  history  of  development  by  means  of
retrospective  criteria,  these  criteria  thereby  run  the  danger  of  turning  into  quasi-
external  standards  insofar  as  the  point  of  their  constitution  and  that  of  their
application are too far from each other and, hence, become unrelated. This is the case
because  Honneth  evaluates  modern  institutions  with  particular  weight  to  their
origination, the zero point of reconstruction. Honneth attributes too much weight to
this phase in his method, if  he assumes that modern institutions and practices qua
being “the outcome of a centuries-long learning process” (Honneth 2014: 17) must be
fundamentally accurate and of  holds a tendency to fall  back into a certain form of
idealism  as  he  blends  together  the  factual  and  the  ideal  in  his  normative
reconstruction, thus becoming “optimistic to the extreme” (Ng 2019: 805).3 Elements of
conflict,  which still  arise  from the play  of  recognition and disrespect  in  Honneth’s
earlier  works  (Honneth  1995:  131,  160),  are  woefully  absent  in  his  normative
reconstruction  when  he  claims  that  the  “fact  that  subjects  actively  preserve  and
reproduce free institutions is theoretical evidence of their historical value” (Honneth
2014: 59). Clearly, the mere fact that subjects participate in social institutions does not
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entail  their  justification,  as  subjects  can reproduce them for many reasons without
considering their legitimacy. 
9 Honneth’s own aspirations as a scholar of Critical Theory are, of course, not simply “to
analyse  factical  relations” (Honneth 2014:  128).  His  fourth methodological  principle
clearly states that the process of normative reconstruction must offer the possibility of
critical  application:  Such  a  mode  of  criticism  accordingly  assumes  that  a  moral
institution could represent certain values in an even more encompassing way. Finally,
normative reconstruction aims to follow “the historical development of each of these
social  spheres,  the  degree  to  which the  understanding of  freedom institutionalized
within them has already been socially attained” (Honneth 2014: viii). He consequently
assumes that existing institutions already guarantee, at least to a certain point,  the
type of freedom he has in mind – and thus remains affirmative to this extent. On the
other hand, in his reconstruction of the three social spheres of freedom, Honneth in
fact not only aims to point out their normative content but also examines intensely the
“misdevelopments” (Honneth 2014: 128) within each sphere. According to Honneth’s
understanding, institutions can produce a “surplus of validity” (Honneth 2003: 150) –
which adds a critical impetus to his theory. Instead of bringing forward criticism from
the  outside,  as  for  Kantian-influenced  scholars,  Honneth’s  approach  is  thus  an
immanent criticism of concrete institutions and their practices. 
10 This critique is carried out in two steps: “These institutions of recognition within which
subjects can achieve social freedom must be designed before the subjects, in a further
step, come to a considered position on that order.” (Honneth 2014: 59). If one takes
seriously  this  second step,  then it  is  also  essential  for  Honneth’s  understanding  of
freedom  to  submit  those  institutions  warranting  freedom  to  a  continuous,  critical
examination regarding the extent to which the values they represent are realized. At
this point, however, opinions diverge regarding the degree of criticism that Honneth’s
method allows. Nullmeier (2013: 23), for example, holds that Honneth’s approach still
does, in principle, allow for radical criticism.4 Contrary to Nullmeier’s conclusion we
believe that, firstly, Honneth’s gradualism is indeed problematic and that, secondly,
Honneth’s methodology in fact does not allow for any form of radical criticism. But why
should mere reformism be a problem; why do we think that from a democracy theory
perspective sometimes more radical changes are necessary?
11 The  shortcomings  of  Honneth’s  gradualism are  especially  evident  in  his  normative
reconstruction of the market sphere. Contrary to Honneth’s claims, the market does
not in fact constitute a sphere of social freedom in the sense that it must be doubted
whether the market can really produce purely intrinsically its own moral and ethical
foundation since, for instance, central market principles conflict with moral and ethical
prerequisites of social freedom. According to Timo Jütten (2015), a market economy
requires that employers exercise a certain, often implicit form of dominance over their
employees.  Only  through  the  implicit  threat  of  unemployment  and  poverty  do
employees stick to their designated roles. Jütten (2015: 192) convincingly claims that
this logic of the functioning of the market as well as the motivational incentives like
fear and greed resulting from it are incompatible with the concept of social freedom,
casting severe doubt on the question of how far the social institutions of the market
really contribute to social freedom or if they do not rather undermine it at least at
some points.
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12 This  is  not  an accidental  misdiagnosis,  but  is  founded  on  the  fact  that  normative
reconstruction, in the shape that it takes in Honneth’s work, does not allow any form of
radical criticism, defining the latter as “all forms of critique that invoke norms that are
not (yet) underlying existing, reproductively relevant social institutions” (Schaub 2015:
108);  Karen Ng goes even so far as to characterize Honneth’s model as “potentially
ideological” (Ng 2019: 811). That is because the method of normative reconstruction is,
in principle, unable to reflect fundamental “misfits” (Schaub 2015: 125) between norms
and institutions in an adequate way. But when taking the Frankfurt School project of
immanent critique seriously, social criticism should allow, though not in an external
fashion,  for  a  perspective  that  transcends  and  fundamentally  transforms  existing
norms (see Jaeggi 2018, ch. 6). Honneth’s inaptitude for radical criticism may already
have been rooted in  his  understanding of  immanence –  as  has  been shown by the
criticism based on Nullmeier – and cannot be properly understood without the latter;
but  it  is  necessary  to  also  consider  its  consequences  beyond  internal  theoretical
contradictions.  Honneth’s  normative  reconstruction does  indeed  capture  so-called
“misdevelopments”;5 but because these are only gradual and not principled deviations,
his method is not only unable to adequately capture fundamental dysfunctionalities,
but  also  runs  the  risk  of  obscuring  problems  that  go  beyond  such  mere  gradual
deviations.
 
2. Honneth’s Half-Hearted Reception of Dewey’s
Experimentalism
13 The  Idea  of  Socialism is  Honneth’s  reaction  to  the  reproach  that  he  argues  too
affirmatively in his reflections about market and democracy in Freedom’s Right. In this
work, Honneth aims at a reformulation of socialism, which he aligns with his concept of
social freedom. Honneth chooses the early socialism of Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier
as  the  point  of  departure,  whose  concepts,  according  to  Honneth,  result  from  the
widening capitalist market which simultaneously hindered the principles of freedom
and equality promised by the revolution: 
Viewed from this perspective, the socialist movement has always been based on an
immanent  critique  of  the  modern,  capitalist  social  order;  it  accepts  the  latter’s
normative bases of justification – liberty, equality and fraternity – but argues that
these values cannot be fully reconciled with each other as long as liberty is not
interpreted in  a  less  individualistic  and more intersubjective  manner.  (Honneth
2017: 13)
14 In  order  to  free  socialism  as  a  “universalizable  substitute”  from  the  roots  of
industrialism, Honneth strives to revive it in its “post-Marxist form” (Honneth 2017:
57f.). For Honneth, the most important task of updating socialism lies in overcoming
the equation of the market economy and capitalism tracing back to Marx, in order to
find free spaces for alternative approaches to the market economy. Honneth argues
that socialism’s fixation on a centrally-planned economy as the only suitable means
must be overcome as quickly as possible and, instead, replaced by an “experimental
market economy” following Dewey (Honneth 2017: 58f.). For this, Honneth identifies
three possible models: 1) a free market in the style of Adam Smith; 2) unions of free
producers  anchored  in  civil  society;  and  3)  the  market-socialist  idea  of  a
democratically-legitimized state economy. According to Honneth, these models are to
be  regarded  as  coequal  at  first;  only  a  renewed  socialism  would  later  have  to
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experimentally  examine  which  model  better  implements  social  freedom within  the
economic sphere and promises  real  progress.  For  this  kind of  assessment,  Honneth
borrows Dewey’s idea of removing barriers that hinder communication and interaction
to serve as a standard of evaluation:
Instead, socialism must be viewed as the specific modern articulation of the fact
that in the course of history and on the basis of varying social circumstances, new
groups  constantly  seek  to  draw  public  attention  to  their  own  demands  by
attempting to tear down barriers to communication and thereby expand the space
of social freedom. (Honneth 2017: 65)
15 Honneth  further  argues  that  this  may  not  remain  a  purely  theoretical  reflection:
Instead,  it  would  be  necessary  for  various  elements  to  be  “test[ed]  under  real
conditions,” while socialism would serve as an “internal archive” to collect records of
already  undertaken  experiments  (Honneth  2017:  70).  In  fact,  Honneth  identifies
empirical  evidence  for  the  two  alternatives  to  a  capitalist  market,  proving  their
successfulness.  This  evidence  ranges  from  the  social  legislation  of  the  early  20th
century to minimum wage legislation to Canadian solidarity funds for employees and
Basque  cooperatives.  Honneth  thereby  rejects  the  ties  of  traditional  socialism  to  a
revolutionary subject like the working class. The progressive element rather appears in
“trace  elements  of  desired  progress”  (Honneth  2017:  73)  of  concrete  institutional
achievements,  into  which  an  expansion  of  social  freedom  had  been  irrevocably
embedded. But at this point, too, the character of Honneth’s formulated criticism and
his  suggestions based on political  realism remain “gradual  rather than categorical”
(Honneth  2014:  9). Even  though  by  including  Dewey’s  experimentalism  Honneth
certainly  adds  a  dynamic  element  to  his  method  of  normative  reconstruction,  we
maintain  that  he  still  remains  too  strongly  rooted  in  an  excessively  restrained
reformism. Characteristic of the limits of gradualism are the examples that Honneth
cites  in  The  Idea  of  Socialism,  e.g.,  the  already  mentioned  social  legislation  at  the
beginning of the 20th century or the introduction of minimum wages. Without wanting
to belittle these achievements, it is becoming clear at present that such reforms can do
little to counter the inequality dynamics of global capitalism (see Piketty 2020).
16 Against this backdrop it is even more disappointing that Honneth does not examine
Dewey’s substantial contributions to democratic socialism. These contributions are far
more  radical  and  do  not  exhaust  themselves  in  sheer  gradualism.  Instead,  Dewey
questions the fundamental structures of modern capitalist societies. But Honneth does
not follow Dewey down this path. One reason for this might lie in the fact that the
latter’s demands, e.g., for a socialization of key industries and banks or a fundamental
redistribution  of  private  property  appear  obsolete  to  Honneth  in  light  of  the  real-
socialist experiments – a view we do not share. The topic of what is to follow, however,
is of a different nature. Rather, we hold that Honneth cannot go beyond an ultimately
conservative  gradualism  due  to  methodological  reasons.  In  The  Idea  of  Socialism,
Honneth refers back to the method of an “immanent critique of the modern, capitalist
social order” (2017: 33), in the same way as he reconstructs the history of socialism at
large according to his own social-philosophical premises (e.g. ibid.: 18, 23, 36). Honneth’s
gradualism, which becomes evident in formulations like “experiments in introducing
change in capitalist  societies” (Honneth 2017:  26)  as  well  as  in his  undifferentiated
defense of “[l]iberal rights to freedom” (Honneth 2017: 35-6), differs considerably from
Dewey’s  radical  new  interpretation  of  such  liberal  rights  to  freedom.  The  latter’s
undertaking in writings such as Individualism. Old and New (1930) or Liberalism and Social
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Action (1935) in fact consists of characterizing the ideals of individual as well as social
freedom in a new way, in order to adapt them to a changed social  reality.  Dewey’s
intention is to overcome a problematic situation, in which old ideals can no longer
fulfill  their  promises.  An  essential  part  of  this  is  questioning  the  liberal  right  of
property, whereas Honneth tends towards overly careful formulations, such as: “the
decisive question remains whether the gradual emancipation of workers can only be
achieved by the expropriation of  private  property  or  whether  this  emancipation is
reconcilable with existing forms of ownership.” (Honneth 2017: 70). As we aim to show
below, Dewey’s radicalism is  fundamentally linked to his  concept of  inquiry and his
philosophy of problem-solving. But beforehand, we shall briefly point out the substantial
differences to Honneth.
 
3. Dewey’s Democratic Socialism
17 In The Ethics of Democracy (EW 1: 227-49), his first contribution to democratic theory,
Dewey already underlines that democracy may not be limited to the sphere of politics.
He claims that only when the democratic ideal is achieved in almost all social sectors,
all  preconditions  for  individual  as  well  as  collective  freedom  will  be  fulfilled.
Accordingly,  at  the  end  of  his  essay,  Dewey  pleads  for  a  democratization  of  the
economy. For him, democracy is “not in reality what it is until it is industrial, as well as
civil  and  political”  (EW 1:  246).  Throughout  his  life,  Dewey  was  convinced  that  a
functioning political democracy requires a comprehensive democratic culture reaching
beyond the sphere of the immediately political. For this reason, he criticizes especially
the oligarchic conditions of the economic sector and calls for an extensive reform of
capitalism.  He  most  notably  pleads  for  a  progressive  income tax,  the  expansion  of
protection  through  the welfare  state  and  an  increase  of  state  economic  activity,
especially in the areas of basic public services and infrastructure (e.g. LW 9: 287-90; see
also  Westbrook  1991).  Until  the  end  of  the  1920’s  Dewey  was  convinced  that  a
democratization of capitalism could be reached first and foremost through the transfer
of  scientific  methods  into  the  economic  sector  and  through  advisory  processes  in
society  as  a  whole.  In  Reconstructions  in  Philosophy,  Dewey  thus  recommends
transferring of the scientific method to the field of politics and morality. The idea of a
scientization  of  politics,  however,  finds  its  clearest  expression  in  The  Public  and  Its
Problems,  his  main  work  in  the  field  of  political  theory  from  1927.  Although  hints
towards the  limits  of  property  rights  and  thus  to  the  possibility  of  a  radical
transformation of society are scattered throughout, the belief predominantly expressed
in this work is that the problems of the public can be solved via a deliberative path,
through  “improvement  of  the  methods  and  conditions  of  debate,  discussion  and
persuasion” (LW 2: 365). On the whole, Dewey was at that time rather a liberal or social
democratic thinker than someone who advocated a radical transformation of society.
18 During the Great Depression, however, Dewey grew more and more aware of the fact
that a “great community” as well as his understanding of deliberative democracy could
only prosper in a place where the economy is under democratic control to the largest
extent possible. As Marc Stears demonstrates convincingly, Dewey grew more and more
radical, despite never giving up on the ideal of deliberative democracy, and “his views
as to how such a democracy could be built, by whom, and when, all radically changed as
the Depression years progressed” (Stears 2010: 86; see also Bordeau 1971). 
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19 In texts like Individualism Old and New (LW 5) and Liberalism and Social Action (LW 11), as
well as in many articles which Dewey wrote during the 1930s he again and again argued
that American society is split into a powerful economic and political elite and a mass of
ordinary citizens, and for many amongst them, the fundamental democratic promises
exist only on paper. The influence of industry and capital is simply too strong, and the
possibilities of shaping decisions through democratic will-formation are very limited.
The consequences that follow are political apathy and the feeling of being unable to
influence political and social decision-making. According to Dewey, this is the exact
opposite of  individuality and freedom. If  the individual  is  unable to shape her life-
enabling environment at all or to a sufficient degree, she is no longer free. Behind his
criticism stands  his  ideal  of  individual  growth  as  a  core  principle  of  a  democratic
community.  Dewey’s  main  point  of  argumentation  is  that  in  a  capitalist  society,
individual growth or self-realization is impossible for a large part of the population. For
that reason, Dewey argues that an individualism focusing only on individual rights –
last but not least the right of property – and serving the powerful few must be replaced
by a new understanding of freedom, namely “effective power to do specific things”
(LW 11:  360).  To  ensure  this  effective  power  for  all  citizens,  intervention  in  the
economy is necessary:
A stable recovery of individuality waits upon an elimination of the older economic
and  political  individualism,  an  elimination  which  will  liberate  imagination  and
endeavor for the task of making corporate society contribute to the free culture of
its  members.  Only  by  economic  revision  can  the  sound  element  in  the  older
individualism – equality of opportunity – be made a reality. (LW 5: 75-6)
20 It  is  quite  evident  that  Dewey  draws  the  consequences  resulting  from  his  earlier
criticism of the “religious idealization […] of private property” (LW 2: 341). Property
rights are nothing but an instrument,  an “end-in-view” that has to be re-examined
once it no longer reaches its goals. In days past, strong personal property rights served
the many, whereas today they only secure the privileges of the rich and thus should be
replaced by a different conception of property (see Betz 1978: 34). According to Dewey,
the main criterion for a just society is not the protection of individual property, as in
classic liberalism, but the equal opportunity for growth. If absolute property rights are
working against this goal, they are no longer “true” and must be replaced by better
institutions. Consequently, Dewey argues in Liberalism and Social Action: “The people will
rule when they have power,  and they will  have power in the degree they own and
control the land, the banks, the producing and distributing agencies of the nation.”
(LW 9: 77).
21 This leads to the question of a concrete configuration of democratic socialism. On the
one hand, Dewey still clings to his faith in collective intelligence and scientific methods
and  distances  himself  from  the  Marxist  doctrine  of  class  struggle.  He  furthermore
unequivocally rejects the use of force – at least up until this point, as shall be seen later.
A complete democratic society, in which “effective power” is widely spread, can only be
achieved through democratic means. For this purpose, Dewey distinguishes between a
bureaucratic  “planned”  society  and  a  democratic  “planning”  society:  “The  former
required fixed blue-prints  imposed from above […]  The latter  means the release of
intelligence through the widest  form of  cooperative give-and-take.”  (LW 13:  321).  It
remains unclear,  however,  how exactly Dewey imagined the implementation of this
model of a democratic planning society. He formulated an abstract ideal rather than
spelling out an institutional arrangement (Westbrook 1991: 457).
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22 It is nevertheless possible to identify four crucial components of democratic socialism
that appear again and again in Dewey’s writings of the 1930’s (see also Bordeau 1971).
The first aspect continues to consist of the combination of scientific expertise and the
participation  of  citizens  to  the  largest  extent  possible;  Dewey  was  against  a  pure
sovereignty  of  experts.  For  this  purpose,  he  advocated  fundamental  reform  of  the
education system, not least of all with the goal of an education for democracy to the
largest  extent  possible.  The  second  aspect  designated  the  socialization  of  essential
areas  of  the  economy,  especially  the  sectors  of  infrastructure,  banking,  and  heavy
industry including mineral resources. Thirdly, Dewey sympathized with Jefferson’s idea
of a ward system, a form of self-government and economic management limited to
small areas that are as local as possible. Fourthly, Dewey took up the idea of a guild
socialism as developed by D.H. Cole. What remained unclear, however, was the nature
of  the  relationship  between state  regulation  and the  individual,  local  cooperatives,
because the local units would be unable to hold their ground entirely without the use of
force. This points to the unsolved problem regarding the transformation of a capitalist
society into a democratic-socialist one: In light of the power structures often bemoaned
by  Dewey  and  the  corruption  of  large  political  parties,  the  established  institutions
could not be employed to induce the hoped-for transformation. On the one hand, this
prompted  Dewey  to  pursue  the  founding  of  a  new,  third  party,  the  League  for
Independent Action, which was to establish a popular alliance between workers, farmers
and  the  lower-middle  class.  He  was  furthermore  active  in  the  Peoples’  Lobby,  an
organization for civil society striving for the development of an alternative public (Lee
2015). On the other hand, however, he was aware that more radical means were equally
necessary. Even though Dewey formulates this notion very carefully, he comes to the
conclusion that use of force might be legitimate in at least one situation, this being the
case when a  minority  rejects  the majority’s  democratic  will  for radical  change and
“refuses by force to permit the method of intelligent action to go into effect” (LW 11:
61). In this scenario, he was particularly thinking of coercive instruments of the state.
Especially  if  a  minority  is  able  to  make use of  the state  apparatus  to  protect  their
privileges, democratic practice may also be “buoyant, crusading and militant” (LW 11:
299), as he explained in Democracy is Radical (see also Livingston 2017). Thus contrary to
the wide-spread equation of pragmatism and piecemeal social reform, Dewey pleaded
for a fundamental transformation of capitalist society, in order to create a social base
for a new and more democratic liberalism: “It follows finally that there is no opposition
in principle  between liberalism as  social  philosophy and radicalism in action,  if  by
radicalism is signified the adoption of policies that bring about drastic, instead of piece-
meal, social change.” (LW 11: 293).
23 In the following section we would like to develop the thesis that Dewey’s radicalism
stems from his methodological reflections, both with respect to his political demands
as well as regarding the means to achieve them.
 
4. Dewey’s Methodology of Problem-Solving
24 The  point  of  departure  for  Dewey’s  methodological  reflections  is  the  naturalistic
assumption  that,  throughout  their  lives,  human  beings  will  encounter  problematic
situations.  According  to  Dewey,  a  problematic  situation  is  characterized  by  the
appearance of an unforeseen element, the failure of customary actions, or the presence
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of  a  conflict  between  people  or  between  different  goals  that  cannot  be  achieved
simultaneously.
25 How can a problematic situation of this kind be overcome? Aside from ignoring the new
situation or simply sitting it out, there are two fundamental possibilities: one can select
an  alternative  course  of  action  at  random  or  follow  a  method  of  thinking  which
increases  the  chances  of  solving  the  problem.  Dewey  designates  the  latter  as  the
scientific method or the method of intelligence. The role models to which he looks are
the experimental natural sciences, whose success he traces back to two factors: Firstly,
they abandoned the search for certainty; unchangeable entities or the divine being are
no longer the focus of their considerations. They rather attempt to unlock nature’s
secrets  by  actively  influencing  the  object  of  research  and  by  experimenting  with
different  forms  of  investigation.  According  to  Dewey,  however,  it  is  not  only  this
experimental approach that vouches for the successfulness of natural sciences. Beyond
that,  it  is  the cooperation of  the “scientific  community,”  which enables  continuous
progress  in  the  creation  of  knowledge  through  the  exchange  and  discussion  of
hypotheses.  In  other  words,  herein  is  shown  the  instrumental  dimension  of
communication.
26 For the following elaborations, two aspects are central. Firstly, Dewey links his model
of intelligent problem-solving to the idea of growth. Each time a conflict gets resolved
creatively, something new comes into existence. This new element, however, can in
turn  become  problematic  itself  after  a  certain  amount  of  time,  so  that  a  new
problematic situation ensues. According to Dewey, a process like this can neither be
completed nor can the direction of this growth be predicted. More important, however,
is  that  the  idea  of  growing  experience  provides  Dewey  with  a  criterion  for  the
assessment of problem solutions, because the latter must not block a further growth of
experience – a rule that is valid in an egalitarian sense. Secondly, Dewey advocates
transferring this method of intelligent problem-solving, which he also calls “inquiry,”
to areas of morality and politics, that is to say to those areas that regulate social life.
His  conviction  is  that  moral,  social,  and  political  problems  admit  of  intelligent
solutions. Correspondingly, he hopes for an improvement of social institutions through
application of the experimental method, which for him means, in accordance with his
theory of science, an engagement with concrete problems and a collective search for
creative problem solutions. 
27 For Dewey, this means in particular that thought taboos in the areas of morality and
politics  are  broken  up,  that  values  and  institutions  are  no  longer  understood  as
unchangeable  principles  but  as  instruments  to  achieve  certain  purposes  that  are
changeable on their part:  “The general adoption of the scientific attitude in human
affairs  would  mean  nothing  less  than  a  revolutionary  change  in  morals,  religion,
politics and industry. […] The scientific attitude is experimental as well as intrinsically
communicative. If it were generally applied, it would liberate us from the heavy burden
imposed by dogmas and external standards.” (LW 5: 115). He summarizes this course of
action under the term social  inquiry.  However,  Dewey needs to be protected from a
common  misunderstanding  that  he  abetted  himself  through  the  rather
undifferentiated  use  of  the  expression  scientific  method.  When  speaking  about  the
transfer of scientific thinking to the area of politics and morality, he is not concerned
with the transfer of scientific theories and methods but with the application of the
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experimental spirit – which, in his view, is embodied in the most adequate way in the
natural sciences – to social conflicts. 
28 But while, according to Dewey, the natural sciences can look back upon considerable
successes, the development of socio-scientific research is still at its very beginning, in
terms of its methodological foundations as well as its results. In order to successfully
approximate scientific methods, the mixing of social sciences with moral categories has
to be broken up first. According to Dewey: “Approach to human problems in terms of
moral blame and moral approbation, of wickedness or righteousness, is probably the
greatest single obstacle now existing to development of competent methods in the field
of social subject-matter.” (LW 12: 489). Consequently, Dewey demands breaking with a
language  that  strongly  separates  science  and  morality,  similar  to  breaking  with
Scholasticism’s neo-Aristotelian world view, which enabled the success story of natural
sciences.
29 What,  then,  is  the  essence  of  the  scientific  method  that  Dewey  would  like  to  see
transferred to the field of politics and morality? In The Quest for Certainty Dewey lists
three characteristics of experimental research:
The  first  is  the  obvious  one  that  all  experimentation  involves  overt doing,  the
making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it. The second
is that experiment is not a random activity but is directed by ideas which have to
meet the conditions set by the need of the problem including the active inquiry.
The third and concluding feature, in which the other two receive their full measure
of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed activity is the construction of a new
empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such
that the consequences of directed operations form the objects that have the property
of being known. (LW 4: 70)
30 Transferred to the social sciences, the following demands arise for Dewey: Firstly, the
process  of  research  is  to  be  understood  as  a  reciprocal  relationship  of  theory  and
practice. The starting point of each social inquiry is a concrete problem, while the goal
is the creation of an unproblematic situation which should, however, differ from the
previous,  problem-causing  state.  Consequently,  the  objective  is  not  a  return  to,  but
rather a more or less extensive transformation of the situation and thus the growth of
experience.  The  path  to  this  result  consists  of  phases  of  theoretical  reflection  and
practical  implementation  that  are  interlocked  in  such  a  way  that  they  mutually
enlighten each other. These phases of practical implementation are to be understood as
experiments until a satisfying solution for the problem is found. Here Dewey attaches
particular  significance  to  the  understanding  of  research  as  an  open  and  revisable
process.  During  this  process,  “facts”  (which  for  Dewey  includes  values  and  belief
systems) are not simply regarded as given but considered as means that either promote
or hinder the transformation of a situation: “[F]acts have to be determined in their dual
function as obstacles and as resources; that is, with reference to operations of negation
(elimination) and affirmation.” (LW 12: 493). 
31 Secondly,  the  cultural  embeddedness  of  all  research  must  also  be  considered.  The
meaning of “facts” arises from the context in which they are situated. Furthermore, the
evaluations, which are meant to result from an examination of these “facts,” need to
remain  rooted  in  that  context,  or  from  the  outset  they  risk  falling  short  of  the
problematic  situation’s  transformation.  Thus,  Dewey’s  method  of  social  criticism  is
immanent to the extent that he views values and norms as constitutive elements of a
problematic situation. As such, they serve as resources for the treatment of problems,
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but  they  can  also  act  as  essential  triggers  of  a  problematic  situation.  Accordingly,
Dewey is clearly no socialist utopian: social change for him always concerns practical
problems to  be solved and his  criticism,  precisely,  is  not  conducted externally.  For
instance,  in  his  critical  engagement  with  liberalism,  he  does  not  simply  wish  to
overthrow the liberal social order but instead aims at its radical transformation from
within.  In  short:  Dewey  advocates  “day  by  day”  change  that  is  orientated  towards
actual  life-world  problems  and  that,  nonetheless,  does  not  exhaust  itself  in  mere
reformism (Dewey 1973: 62).
32 Thirdly, values and norms thus have to be considered in the social inquiry, and this in a
double sense: On the one hand Dewey rejects the ideal of a value-free social science; as
far  as  it  is  considered  an  experimental  science,  that  is,  an  activity  that  aims  at
transformation,  it  must  carry  out  evaluations  and  must  itself  classify  results  as
desirable or undesired (LW 12: 490). On the other hand, value convictions are social
facts that can likewise generate a problem constellation. This applies not least to the
individual  property  rights,  which  the  later  Dewey,  as  shown  above,  regards  as  a
substantial  obstacle  for  comprehensive  social  reconstruction.  But  in  contrast  to
Honneth, for whom “basic fundamental rights” are firmly written into the grammar of
modern society, Dewey opposes the acceptance of allegedly eternal or unimpeachable
values.6 
33 The  background  to  this  criticism  of  seemingly  eternal  values  is  Dewey’s  “genetic
method,”  which  Thelma  Lavine  summarizes  as  “argu[ing]  from  the  time-bound,
culture-bound character  of  problematic  situations  and  the  responses  they  evoke:  a
response  in  the  form  of  a  religious,  or  philosophic,  or  political  view,  which  was
adequate to a past situation or to a situation in a different cultural context” (Lavine
1985:  64).  What this  genetic  method means becomes especially  clear in the already
mentioned discussion of Dewey’s critique of classical liberalism in Individualism Old and
New (LW 5).  There  he  argues  that  Locke’s  liberalism  in  his  time  was  an  adequate
response to the encrusted structures of feudalism, but is only a hindrance in the face of
current problems that require stronger government action. The decisive gain of this
genetic  or  historical  perspective  thus  consists  in  the  de-dogmatization  of  social
institutions, such as the right to property, which at a certain point in time may well
have been conducive to liberal goals, but under changed conditions can be reversed.
34 This problematization of fundamental values can and is supposed to take place in a
rational and thus scientific way, as Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam state in following
Dewey:
As an end-in-view a situation is evaluated both in terms of the means necessary to
its realization and in terms of its future consequences. All these evaluations are
rational in the sense defined by Dewey. Dewey does not deny that we value things,
states of affairs, and so on, without consideration of their status as means or
consequences,  but  he  holds  that  while  such  valuings,  like  the  qualitative
observations of everyday life, may and do initiate inquiry, they are not its outcome.
What  has  just  been said  undermines the fact/value distinction by showing that
paradigmatic value judgments are as amenable to rational-experiential warrant as
are means consequences judgments. (Putnam & Putnam 1994: 205-6)
35 If it is indeed those same values that stand in the way of the solution to a problem and
consequently  the growth of  experience,  then the social  inquiry must  address  these
convictions  and  possibly  attempt  to  change  them.  If  the  aspired  goals  cannot  be
realized with the available means or if costs turn out to be too high, then these same
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objectives become revisable. “Ends have to be adjudged (evaluated) on the basis of the
available means by which they can be attained just as much as existential materials
have to be adjudged (evaluated) with respect to their function as material means of
effecting a resolved situation.” (LW 12: 490). 
36 Consequently, the idea of a dialectical connection between means and ends is a central
point of Dewey’s philosophy. Moreover, he never considers values to be final, but only
“ends-in-view,” which are as such constituents of a continuum of means and purposes.
Dewey’s backdrop for this reflection is the fact that in uncertain situations, not only
the means available for achieving a certain end can prove to be problematic, but also
the ends themselves. This can be the case, for instance, if an end can only be achieved
with quite considerable costs or if  the necessary means are simply not available. In
such constellations, the ends of actions and the values standing behind them are called
into question. 
37 Therefore, there are no predetermined, unchangeable ends that acting individuals can
use for orientation during their search for solutions to problems. Nevertheless,  this
search is not entirely blind. Firstly, one must remember the pragmatist maxim stating
that,  in  problematic  situations,  we  are  always  dealing  with  a  concrete  doubt.  This
means that there definitely is a broad reservoir of convictions and means from which
the acting individual can draw. But it is equally possible to imagine situations in which
recourse  to  seemingly  unproblematic  convictions  is  impossible.  In  constellations  of
such  kind,  a  search  for  new  means,  but  possibly  also  for  new  ends  or  a  new
configuration of ends must be conducted; as a result, new convictions are created. One
example  of  this  is  a  new  understanding  of  individual  rights  and,  in  particular,  a
different conception of property oriented towards common welfare.
38 As  mentioned,  Dewey’s  most  crucial  thought  is  that  such  a  creation  will  lead  to  a
growth of experience, so long as it points beyond what already exists. He ascribes a
normative-aesthetic quality to this growth of experience (see Joas 1997: 139-41). In his
Studies in Logical Theory, Dewey correspondingly characterizes as follows the benchmark
that the success or failure of the thinking process must be able to be measured against:
“The measure of its success, the standard of its validity, is precisely the degree in which
the thinking actually disposes of  the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more
direct  modes  of  experiencing,  that  are  forthwith  possessed  of  more  assured  and
deepened value.” (MW 2:  299-300).  Consequently,  thinking is  in no way limited to a
passive adaptation of the agent to a problematic environment.
39 In  his  religious-philosophical  treatise  A  Common  Faith (LW 9),  Dewey  distinguishes
between  three  forms  of  interplay  that  the  human  organism  experiences  with  his
environment  in  light  of  problematic  situations.  The  first  and  most  simple  form  is
“accommodation.” This designates a passive adaptation to the respective situation; we
adjust to the new situation and align our actions accordingly. The second type is what
Dewey calls  “adaptation.” In this  case,  we don’t  adjust  to our environment,  but we
actively act upon it in order to shape it according to our goals. The third and highest
form  of  transformation,  however,  is  “adjustment.”  Here,  we  neither  adjust  to  our
environment nor do we transform it according to our intentions, but our goals and
values themselves are up for revision: “It is a change of will conceived as the organic
plenitude of our being, rather than any special change in will.” (LW 9: 13; emph. i. o.).
Consequently,  it  is  the  individual  or  a  community  of  individuals  with  her/their
fundamental value concepts that are at the heart of the transformation. Dewey labels
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exactly  those  experiences  during  which  the  fundamental  points  of  orientation  for
action are generated or revised as religious experiences.7
40 This idea of a fundamental transformation of values can also be transferred onto social
communities, which is exactly what Dewey’s concept of “social reconstruction” aimed
at (Campbell 1984). That is to say that overcoming problematic situations can equally
be about fundamental social structures – for instance, that of property ownership – or
about social value patterns – such as widespread individualism. Against this backdrop,
however,  the criticism formulated by Rahel Jaeggi  (2018:  249),  stating that  Dewey’s
concept would fail “with regard to the higher level character and the reflexive nature
of the problems” of extensive forms of life, is not convincing. For Jaeggi it is important
that Dewey conceptualizes problems as “inderterminate situation” because this notion
is embedded in a contextual whole and, therefore, problems must be conceived not as
isolated  phenomena  but  as  a  disturbance  of  the  whole  system.  However,  Jaeggi
perceives Dewey’s problem-solving procedure as overly optimistic when it comes to the
solving of problems because, in her understanding, Dewey conceptualizes problems only
as fractures that enter into a principally intact social world.
41 However, his model of social inquiry especially provides a reflexivity that enables a
problematization of “forms of life” with respect to their problematic conditions. In his
model Dewey counted, as mentioned before, first of all on deliberative practices or, in
his words, on the method of intelligence: 
As a matter of fact, the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of
mind is to project new and more complex ends – to free experience from routine
and from caprice.  Not the use of  thought to accomplish purposes already given
either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but
the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson. [...]
A pragmatic intelligence is a creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic. (MW 10:
44-4)
42 Without  Dewey  himself  having  explicitly  emphasized  this  aspect,  the  creativity  of
intelligence also includes its reflexivity. This reflexivity includes the reflection of its
own limits, leading Dewey to a stronger connection of theory and praxis – an element
that  Honneth’s  methodology  clearly  disregards.  In our  context,  this  means  that  in
certain problematic situations it is possible to recognize that social reforms cannot be
demanded by scientific methods alone.8 Rather,  overcoming the capitalist regime of
inequality requires genuinely political methods, which for Dewey, as mentioned above,
include not only classic forms of party politics but also (mass) strikes. Strikes would
then be a means to come closer to the ideal of democratic socialism; and democratic
socialism  would  then  be  a  means  to  realize  the  liberal  values  of  individuality  and
freedom not only for a few, but for as many people as possible.
 
5. The Superiority of Pragmatism
43 To  conclude,  we  would  like  to  summarize  the  results  of  this  comparison  in  three
principles which establish the superiority of Dewey’s pragmatic method of problem-
solving in comparison to Honneth’s normative reconstruction: Firstly,  Dewey avoids
Honneth’s  socio-ontological  optimism  and  rather  assumes  a  deficient  status  quo;
secondly, these dysfunctionalities are placed at the center of his method; and thirdly,
Methodologies Matter
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
15
this  concept  is  embedded  in  a  pragmatist  frame  of  day-to-day  and  lifeworld
experiences.
44 (1) Compared to Honneth’s thesis of “the largely rational character of the institutional
reality” (which he adopted from Hegel) and its derived goal of “conversely showing
moral rationality to have already been realized in core modern institutions” (Honneth
2014: 2), Dewey draws a completely different picture of social reality. His approach does
not focus on the continuity of institutions and practices but on their dynamics and
their transformation. Since Dewey does not share Honneth’s thesis of the correctness of
those institutions and practices fundamental to societies of democratic capitalism, his
demands are not limited to gradual reforms in small steps, which would be supported
by a broad majority because of the insight into the supposed rationality of the existing
institutions. He rather demands a considerably more radical transformation of society.
According  to  our  understanding,  this  conflictual  dynamic  of  social  realities  is  not
merely a historical mirror of the dismissal of the context in which Dewey’s texts of the
1930’s arose, but a direct result of his methodological reflections. 
45 (2)  Dewey’s  model  of  continuous  problem-solving  arises  from  the  basic  pragmatist
assumption  of  the  continuity  of  the  world  of  experience  and  the  environment.
Problems  are  identified,  experimentally  processed,  and  finally  solved,  before  these
solutions  become  potential  new  problems  over  time.  This  takes  account  of  the
assumption that problems are precisely not epiphenomena of an otherwise intact social
world,  but  are rooted in their  center.  Honneth’s  attempt in The Idea  of  Socialism to
transfer the aspect  of  Dewey’s  problem-processing into his  own model  is,  however,
short-sighted, as he limits his reception of Dewey’s approach mainly to the aspect of its
experimentalism  and  thereby  neglects  the  aspect  of  problem-identification,  which
actually precedes the former. By turning away from the possible reception of Dewey’s
method of social inquiry he misses out on the chance to integrate an element into his
theory that broaches exactly the subject of this at least potentially fundamental issue.
Unlike  Honneth,  who  refuses  the  possibility  that  central  social  structures  can  be
fundamentally  dysfunctional,  Dewey  conceives  the  social  world  precisely  not  as
basically unimpaired. It should be clear that for Dewey problems are not to be resolved
ultimately but rather serve to identify concrete problems of a society that is inherently
conflictual.  Particularly with Dewey’s notion of growth in mind, it  becomes evident
that problem-solving for him is not a process to be completed but always depends on
the possibility of further growth and thus includes a notion of constant transformation.
Since Dewey rightfully holds that there are no ultimate, unchangeable values or norms,
this kind of transformation does not exhaust itself in mere reformism. Rather, ends are
always dialectically entangled with their respective means and their initial problematic
situation and, hence, ends themselves are always up for revision. 
46 (3) Finally, Dewey’s method of problem-solving activity is embedded in the pragmatist
tradition, which takes concrete life-world experiences seriously and in that way avoids
exuberant theoretical presuppositions. Rather, everyday experiences of problems and
dysfunctionality are not betrayed in favor of allegedly superior theoretical insights.
This is due to the fact that Dewey’s methodology embraces its own reflexivity including
its  limits.  Instead  of  assuming  and  prioritizing  the  fundamental  rationality  of
institutions and practices like Honneth, Dewey’s approach makes it  possible to take
into consideration social and political problems that can be experienced in reality. This
concession makes space for the possibility that scientific methodology at some point
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might come to an end and that certain issues might instead require genuine political
engagement.  Because  Dewey’s  method  permits  a  more  immediate  integration  of
practical  experiences,  it  is  more open to new, unpredictable and radically different
forms of  problems that  could  conceivably  arise  and therefore  open to  significantly
more dynamic and radical transformations.
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NOTES
1. Arvi  Särkelä  (2017)  opposes  this  opinion  and  highlights  the  strong  points  of  immanent
criticism  in  the  style  of  Dewey  (and  Hegel)  compared  to  contemporary  Critical  Theory,  in
particular Jaeggi (2018).
2. Honneth had indeed already highlighted previously,  during his  debate  with  Nancy Fraser
(Fraser  &  Honneth  2003),  that  the  notion  of  struggles  for  recognition  should,  despite  its
intersubjective  focus,  not  remain  on  the  anthropological  level;  however,  the  method  of
normative  reconstruction  as  a  “strategy  of  picking  up  on  values  and  ideas  already
institutionalized in society” (Honneth 2014: 63) can also be interpreted as Honneth’s attempt to
address this gap left open in his earlier work.
3. Some of the here-mentioned critics take up a notably more open-minded position towards
Honneth’s  early  work  than  towards  the  method  of  normative  reconstruction  presented  in
Freedom’s Right. For Nullmeier (2013: 29f.) and Ng (2019: 806), this assessment is based mostly on
Honneth’s  notion  of  recognition  (Honneth  1995);  Fabian  Freyenhagen  (2017:  466f.)  likewise
perceives  more  potential  in  Honneth’s  early  work,  although  rather  in  the  latter’s  notion  of
pathology than in his notion of recognition (Honneth 2007, 2009).
4. However, Nullmeier also clearly reveals that, for him, the primary problem lies not in the
aforementioned aspect, but rather in the method’s flawed understanding of immanence. Because
the problem of violated immanence is of greater importance for him, he does not feel responsible
to answer this thesis.
5. While in his early work (2007, 2009) Honneth still operates with the concept of pathology,
which concerns the state of societies as such, he relinquishes this concept in Freedom’s Right in
favor of a division of labor with “societal aberrations.” By doing so, he robs himself of an all-
encompassing “umbrella term” (Särkelä & Laitinen 2019: 286), which would be able to capture
exactly such general social wrongs and refer to a comprehensive transformation of society (see
ibid.)
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6. However, it can be argued that Dewey’s concept of growth is a kind of super value: “We set up
this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal is but to
arrest  growth.”  (LW 7:  306;  emph.  i.  o.).  On  the  normative  substance  of  Dewey’s  concept  of
growth and its implications for democratic theory, see below and Jörke (2003).
7. Similar to how Dewey proceeds in his book on art, he attempts to radically broaden the scope
of religious experiences in his philosophy of religion as well and opposes the view that equates
religiosity with the belief in transcendental deities (see in more detail Joas 2001). 
8. To that extent, he is in this point in agreement with C. Wright Mills’s (1966) criticism of the
limits of the scientific method (see also Simich & Rick 1978).
ABSTRACTS
This article compares Axel Honneth’s method of normative reconstruction with John Dewey's
method of problem-solving. We argue that Dewey’s method is more open to “radical” measures
of social transformation because it does not bear Honneth’s inherent conservative implications.
Dewey’s “more radical” measures include, in particular, demands for a socialist transformation
of  the  economy,  whereas  Honneth’s  approach  leads  to  mere  reformist  proposals  within  the
existing  property  system,  such  as  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  wage.  We  situate  this
juxtaposition in the more recent discussion on the methodology of critical theories and argue
that, despite the recent turn of Critical Theorists towards Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, the
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